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EVIDENCE ISSUES IN CINA CASES
November 2, 2009
Lynn McLain
University of Baltimore School of Law

I.

Do the Rules of Evidence (Including the Hearsay Rule) Apply?1
A.

Yes, in:
● Juvenile adjudicatory hearings, generally, In re Michael G., 107 Md.
App. 257, 265, 667 A.2d 956 (1995).

B.

No (except Testimonial Privileges2 which do apply), in:
● Detention and shelter care hearings under Rule 11-112 (Md. Rules
5-101(b)(11) & 11-112d).

C.

Rules re: Testimonial Privileges3 and Competency of Witnesses4 Apply, But the
Court, in the Interest of Justice, May Decline to Strictly Apply Other Evidence
Rules, in:
● Disposition hearings under Md. Rule 11-115, including permanency
planning hearings under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-823 (Md.
Rule 5-101(c)(6)); In re Ashley E., 387 Md. 260, 280-81, 874 A.2d 998
(2005).
● Modification hearings under Md. Rule 11-116 (Md. Rule 5-101(c)(7)).

D.

Are There Standards Even If the Evidence Rules Do Not Apply?
● Yes, due process requires that the trial court evaluate “whether
evidence proffered for admission is sufficiently reliable and

1

See generally 5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 101:1 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2007)
(accessible on Westlaw as 5 Maryland Evidence § 101:1) (hereinafter ―MARYLAND EVIDENCE‖).
2

As to testimonial privileges, see 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE§§ 501:1–520:1 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009) (available on
Westlaw as [volume #] Maryland Evidence [section #]).
3
4

Id.
See Md. Rules 5-601 & 5-603; Matoumba v. State, 390 Md. 554, 553, 890 A.2d 288 (2006).
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probative. . . .” In re Billy W., 387 Md. 405, 434, 875 A.2d 734 (2005)
(under facts of case, no error in admitting testimony of (1) a DSS social
worker, to mother‘s statements during visits with the children, and to
information provided social worker by psychologist conducting family
therapy sessions, and (2) two CASA‘s, to statements made by the children
and by one of their foster parents — CASA‘s should have been sworn and
subject to cross-examination, but no objection was made on those bases).
II.

Parents’ Opportunity to Testify and to Cross-Examine in Shelter Care Hearings
● In re Damien F., 182 Md. App. 546, 958 A.2d 402 (2008) (reversing
shelter case orders based on proffers from DSS and Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, when parents were denied opportunity to present
witness testimony to challenge material allegations in Departments‘ CINA
petitions; given contradiction of competing proffers, trial court should
have exercised discretion, as parents also should have been afforded
opportunity to cross-examine the Departments’ witnesses; Court of
Special Appeals also suggests lower court erred in crediting unnamed
reporters, when it was given no information from which it could
determine their credibility. The Court of Special Appeals held, at
583-85:
When presented with a request by counsel for the parent or
parents to be allowed to present witnesses at a shelter care
hearing, as a threshold matter, the court should ask counsel to
denote the allegations asserted to be in dispute. The judge
should make an initial determination as to whether the competing
versions of behavior or events, viz a viz, the proffered testimony
versus the allegations in the petition, are in dispute.
We hold that, unless the disputed allegation is probatively
inconsequential to a determination of whether placement is
required to protect a child from serious immediate danger or
that removal from the home is necessary to provide for the
safety and welfare of the child, the court must receive
testimony as to the material, disputed allegations and a denial
of the request to produce witnesses, in that instance, is an
abuse of discretion.
***
. . . To be sure, the court, in any proceeding, may insist on the
relevancy of the proposed testimony of a witness. The only
limitation that the court should impose in a shelter care
2

hearing is that only testimony of witnesses which directly
contradicts the allegation of abuse may be offered.
(Emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Note: Adverse inference when parent does not testify:
In re Damien F., 182 Md. App. at 584 n.5 (―We note in passing that the one witness who
usually has peculiar knowledge of the facts underlying the disputed allegations is the parent who
requests an evidentiary hearing in the shelter care proceeding. When such parent, after
requesting an evidentiary hearing, then fails to take the witness stand and testify, the trial
court may infer that the testimony not produced would have been unfavorable.‖).
III.

Testimonial Privileges v. Confidential Matters
A.

Attorney-Client Privilege

The Court of Appeals has found reversible error in a trial court‘s permitting a party to
be asked on cross-examination whether he had talked about his testimony with his lawyer:
the mere fact that confidential communications occurred, as well as when, is privileged. Blanks
v. State, 406 Md. 526, 959 A.2d 1180 (2008) (defendant did not ―open the door‖ on direct by
testifying that he had told ―just his father‖ about a particular fact).
See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 503:1 et seq.
B.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 504:1 et seq.
1.

In General

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-109 protects “communications relating to
diagnosis or treatment” of a patient’s “mental or emotional disorder” from ―a psychiatrist,
licensed psychologist, or any other person participating directly or vitally with either in rendering
those services in consultation with or under direct supervision of a psychiatrist or psychologist.‖
The statute does not protect statements made to psychotherapists for purposes other than
treatment, such as for a court-ordered evaluation.
The Court of Special Appeals has indicated that the privilege does not extend to
communications made by members of a group program, during therapy in group sessions (but
they are ―confidential records,‖ which are entitled to some protection; see III.C. infra). Reynolds
v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 368, 633 A.2d 455 (1993) (―Records of statements made by the
patient during group therapy sessions, records of statements made by the patient to other
3

patients during a hospital stay, and records of medication prescribed for the patient are not
privileged under C.J. § 9-109. These records are confidential and the patient has a right to
privacy with respect to them, but they should not be kept from defense counsel under the theory
that they are privileged.‖) (dictum) (emphasis added).
2.

Waiver

Under the statute, a minor child, or anyone under disability, is considered incompetent
to assert or waive the privilege. In a child custody case, the child‘s parents may not assert or
waive the child‘s privilege; the court must appoint a guardian to act in the child’s best
interest. Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123, 126, 460 A.2d 49 (1983). The same reasoning applies
in a CINA proceeding.
The Court of Special Appeals has held that, in a CINA proceeding, a mother, who
responded to the county department of social services’ assertion that she was mentally unfit by
submitting a doctor‘s letter concerning her recent mental evaluations, did not introduce her
mental condition as an element of her claim or defense, and thus did not waive her
psychotherapist-patient privilege. In re Matthew R., 113 Md. App. 701, 688 A.2d 955 (1997).
See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 504:1–504:3.
3.

Exceptions in Similar Statutes

Maryland also has similar statutes protecting the relationship of a client and a
psychiatric-mental health nursing specialist, or a certified professional counselor (§
9-109.1), which tracks the psychiatrist-psychologist statute, except that § 9-109.1 omits the
exception found in § 9-109(d)(5) regarding defective delinquency proceedings and instead adds
the following subsection:
There is no privilege in:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Any administrative or judicial nondelinquent juvenile proceeding;
Any guardianship and adoption proceeding initiated by a child placement
agency;
Any guardianship and protective services proceeding concerning a
disabled person; or
Any criminal or delinquency proceeding in which there is a charge of child
abuse or neglect or that arises out of an investigation of suspected child
abuse or neglect.

4

4.

Required Reporting of Child Abuse

By virtue of Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-704, health practitioners and social workers
who, during treatment, come across evidence of child abuse, must report that abuse,
―notwithstanding . . . any law on privileged communications.‖ This requirement to report
information outside the context of testifying as a witness in a court proceeding does not
compromise the evidentiary testimonial privilege not to be compelled to testify in court.
C.

Confidential (But Not Privileged) Information

See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 501:1.
1.

In Camera Review May Be Possible, Or It May Not Be Enough

In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held
that, although a person accused of a sex crime against a child has no constitutional right to
inspect confidential files of a child welfare agency that reflect the victim‘s statements
regarding abuse, the trial court must review the files in camera to determine whether information
is ―material‖ to the defense.
In Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 88, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992), the Court of Appeals reviewed a
trial court‘s decision to deny a child abuse defendant access to the alleged victim‘s confidential
school records. The defendant had subpoenaed the records from the School Board. After an in
camera review, the trial court had concluded that it did not find ― ‗any kind of evidence that
would be directly admissible for impeachment purposes.‘ ‖ Id. The Court of Appeals reversed.
In an opinion by Judge Bell, the court first concluded that the federal statute underlying
the applicable Maryland regulation did not ―create a privilege against disclosure of student
records to be invoked by the school, the student, or his or her parents.‖ Id. Nonetheless, a
student has a privacy interest in the records. Therefore, the trial judge, ―in the exercise of
discretion, must conduct a balancing test in which the privacy interest of the student is weighed
against the genuine need of the party requesting the information for its disclosure.‖ Id. at 73.
The Court of Appeals found the goal of confidentiality under the student records statute
to be (1) less important than that goal is with regard to a state‘s confidential child abuse
information, such as that addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, and (2) weaker than the privacy interest protected by a similar Maryland child abuse
records statute in State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 566 A.2d 88 (1989).
It pointed out that there are several alternative procedures for a trial court to consider:
(1)
(2)

in camera review by the court alone, as was approved in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie;
unqualified access by the defendant and defense counsel, as in Carr and
5

(3)
(4)

Leonard with regard to prior written statements – as to which there is no
privacy interest – of state‘s witnesses who have testified;
in camera review with counsel present; or
review by counsel for both parties as officers of the court, followed by an
in camera hearing on the admissibility of those portions of the records
defense counsel seeks to admit.

Id. at 84-88. As guidance for trial courts in future cases, Judge Bell opined:
Which option the court chooses must depend on various factors, including the degree
of sensitivity of the material to be inspected; the strength of the showing of the ―need to
inspect‖; whether the information sought is readily identifiable; considerations of judicial
economy, etc. The greater the “need to inspect” showing, i.e., as here, where it is
self-evident [because the question of the victim’s credibility is crucial to the case]
and the less sensitive the information, for example, the more likely the records will
be reviewed jointly by the court and counsel or by counsel as officers of the court.
...
Only when the records are not even arguably relevant and usable should the court
deny the defendant total access to the records. In other words, except as to
information, which, without regard to the perspective of the person conducting the
review, has absolutely no possible relevance to the case, the trial court's in camera review
should not be conducted with preclusive intent.
Id. at 87-88.
When the trial court concludes that there is not even arguable relevance, it ―should mark
and seal the records excluded so that the judge's determination in that regard may be reviewed on
appeal.‖ Id. at 88 n.15. The Court of Appeals subsequently approved the same general
approach in civil cases. Department of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 612 A.2d 880
(1992).
In Zaal itself, the Court of Appeals held that ―controlled access by counsel to the records‖
was required, and remanded for consideration of whether the third or the fourth alternative
outlined above was the more appropriate. 326 Md. at 88.
In Samie v. State, 181 Md. App. 59, 955 A.2d 794 (2008), the court addressed in camera
review of confidential juvenile records that might contain inconsistent statements of a key
witness the defense would call as a hostile witness. In a significant opinion by Judge Meredith,
the Court of Special Appeals held that a defendant’s confrontation right was implicated when
a juvenile and his parents had been involved in an altercation with the defendant that led to the
charges against the defendant. The juvenile had agreed to a ―statement of facts‖ that was used in
his juvenile proceedings relating to the melée. The defense sought access to the statement of
facts for potential use as impeachment evidence when it called the juvenile as a hostile witness.
The applicable statute permits disclosure of confidential juvenile matters “upon good cause
6

shown,” and the trial court was held to have committed reversible error in not examining the
material in camera and deciding whether that standard was met.
2.

Exclusion of Public from the Hearing

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-810(b)(2) provides: ―The [juvenile] court shall
exclude the general public from a hearing where the proceedings involve discussion of
confidential information from the child abuse and neglect report and record, or any information
obtained from the child welfare agency concerning a child or family who is receiving Title IV-B
child welfare services or Title IV-E foster care of adoption assistance.‖
The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the legislative history of the statute, concluded that
its purpose is ―to prevent disclosure of confidential information concerning allegations and
evidence of abuse that would impair the treatment and rehabilitation of the children and parents
or guardians involved‖ and that, therefore, a juvenile court judge had not erred in permitting
social workers ―who already knew of information concerning the child abuse in issue to remain
during the hearing.‖ In re Ashley E., 387 Md. 260, 874 A.2d 998 (2005).
3.

“Privileged” Matters

In Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 127-28, 651 A.2d 877 (1995), which concerned
psychiatrist-patient records, the majority of the Court of Appeals distinguished between
“privileged” matters and merely “confidential” matters and held that ―in order to abrogate a
privilege such as to require disclosure at trial of privileged records, a defendant must establish a
reasonable likelihood that the privileged records contain exculpatory information necessary for a
proper defense.‖ A ―speculative assertion that the records might be relevant for impeachment‖
is insufficient. Id. at 133, 135.
IV.

Competency of Children to Testify

If the judge, in his or her discretion, determines – based on interviewing the child – that a
young child has sufficient ability to observe, remember, and communicate the relevant facts
and feels the duty to tell the truth, the judge will permit a child‘s testimony.
Failure to conduct such an examination of the child, and ruling instead that, because of
the child‘s age, he or she is incompetent to testify as a matter of law, has been held to be
reversible error.
See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 601:3. See also Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 9-103 (in a child abuse case, the alleged child victim may not be precluded from
testifying because of ―age.‖).
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V.

Erroneous Admission of Evidence in CINA Proceedings Is Less Crucial than
Erroneous Exclusion

In reviewing nonjury trials, appellate courts will consider only whether the properly
admitted evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, provides sufficient support
for the trial court‘s decision. They will assume that the judge ignored all improper evidence,
unless the judge‘s reliance on it is clear from his or her opinion. See In re Beverly B., 72 Md.
App. 433, 443, 530 A.2d 766, 771 (1987) (trial court made it clear that it did not rely on hearsay
evidence).
VI.

Opinion Evidence: Md. Rules 5-701–5-706

See In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 819 A.2d 1030 (2003) (reversible error to admit and rely
on social worker‘s lay diagnosis that mother was becoming ―manic,‖ which contradicted
testimony of mother‘s psychiatrist).
VII.

Hearsay Exceptions of Particular Interest regarding Child’s Statements: If the
Child Testifies and Is Subject to Cross-Examination Concerning the Statement
A.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(d): ―prompt complaint of sexually assaultive behavior to
which the declarant was subjected,‖ when the complaint is ―consistent with the
declarant’s testimony . . .‖ at the trial or hearing.

See Gaerian v. State, 159 Md. App. 527, 860 A.2d 396 (2004) (child‘s statements to a
peer, within one month of most recent of allegedly years-long sexual abuse, qualified as
―prompt‖); Nelson v. State, 137 Md. App. 402, 409-10, 414-19, 768 A.2d 738 (2001); Harmony
v. State, 88 Md. App. 306, 321, 594 A.2d 1182, 1189 (1991) (evidence of fourteen-year-old girl‘s
telephone call to her sister, relating sexual abuse by their uncle, that had occurred that evening,
was properly admitted as either an ―excited utterance or a timely complaint of a sexual attack‖)
(alternate holding); 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801(3):2.
B.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(a): Written or Recorded Prior Inconsistent Statements, or
Prior Testimony Inconsistent with Testimony Today

See Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993); 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE §
801(1):1.
C.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(b): The Declarant‘s Prior Consistent Statements Made
Before the Alleged Impeaching Fact Tending to Show ―Fabrication, or Improper
Influence or Motive‖

See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (child abuse case); Holmes v. State, 350
Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998); 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801(2):1.
8

VIII. Hearsay Exceptions that Apply Regardless Whether the Child-Declarant Testifies
or Not (in a non-criminal proceeding)
A.

Is Competency of a Child to Testify at Time of Trial Required?

The child declarant need not be shown to have been competent to testify, at least to
permit the child‘s ―excited or spontaneous utterances or [statements offered pursuant to] statutory
admissibility [e.g., ‗tender years‘],‖ Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 715-16, 742-44, 887 A.2d
564 (2005) (Wilner, J., concurring, joined by Battaglia and Greene, JJ.); Jackson v. State, 31 Md.
App. 332, 338-39, 356 A.2d 299 (1976). See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823, 825 (1990);
6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803:1.
B.

Md. Rule 5-803(a): Statement of a Party-Opponent

Who is the party-opponent in a CINA case? The child and the child‘s parent or
guardian are parties. A child‘s statements could be offered against the child as an admission of a
party opponent, but not against his or her parent (unless the parent authorized or adopted the
statements). In re Michael G., 107 Md. App. 257, 667 A.2d 956 (1998). See generally 6A
MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 801(4):1 et seq.
C.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(1): Present Sense Impression

Foundation:
(1)

Statement ―describes or explains an event or condition‖ and

(2)

Was ―made while the declarant was perceiving [it], or immediately
thereafter‖

E.g., ―There‘s nobody here but me.‖ ―Mama‘s asleep and she won‘t wake up.‖
See, e.g., Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986) (declarant‘s unexcited
statement over telephone that a ―girl named Brenda‖ was in his apartment and was ―talking to
‗some guy‘ behind the door‖). See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(1):1.
D.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2): Excited Utterances

Foundation:
(1)

A startling event occurred;

(2)

At the time of the statement, the declarant remained so under the stress of
the startling event as to preclude reflection (and thus fabrication); and
The statement relates to the startling event.

(3)

9

E.g., ―Help! Mama fell down and she‘s hurt!‖ ―Daddy got mad and threw me down the
steps!‖ ―The house is on fire!‖
Compare, e.g., Harmony v. State, 88 Md. App. 306, 317-21, 594 A.2d 1182 (1991) (no
abuse of discretion in admission of evidence as excited utterance, when foundational evidence
supported finding that the statement – a telephone call by a crying fourteen-year-old girl to her
sister, relating sexual abuse by their uncle that had occurred that evening – was uttered
spontaneously, so that she was incapable of ―forethought or deliberate design‖); Jackson v. State,
31 Md. App. 332, 356 A.2d 299 (1976) (statements of a four-year-and-three-month-old victim,
who was crying, of sexual assault to her mother and sister, in response to question what was
wrong, were properly admitted); Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 559-67, 338 A.2d 344 (1975)
(no abuse of discretion to admit statement by three-and-one-half-year-old child that ― ‗Daddy was
mad, Daddy did it,‘ ‖ made to physician in response to question, within hours after alleged
beating which inflicted massive injuries); and Sears v. State, 9 Md. App. 375, 383-84, 264 A.2d
485 (1970) (police officer‘s testimony to statements, within half hour after assault, made by
11-year-old assault victim after she had fled to police station was properly admitted) with
Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 698, 701, 452 A.2d 661 (1982) (stressing ―the importance of
examining the circumstances in toto to determine whether the statement was the result of
reasoning and reflection or a spontaneous response to the exciting event‖; there, declarant‘s
statement to police officer, three hours after witnessing crime and suffering epileptic seizure,
made after she had begun to calm down, when she was interviewed for two hours, and she read
and signed statement, was held to be ―the product of thoughtful consideration and thus outside
the excited utterance exception‖). See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(2):1.
E.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3): Statements of the Declarant’s Then Existing Physical
Condition, No Matter to Whom Made

E.g., ―My tummy hurts.‖
See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 128 Md. App. 79, 143, 736 A.2d 1125 (1999) (child abuse
victim‘s statements), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706 (2001). See
generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(3):2.
F.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3): Statements of the Declarant’s Then Existing State of
Mind or Emotion

The statement cannot be offered to prove something that happened before the statement
was made. E.g., ―I hate Auntie because she beats me‖ (admissible to prove emotion but not
what caused it so last part must be redacted, even if child‘s state of mind is relevant).
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See, e.g., Nash v. State, 69 Md. App. 681, 690-91, 519 A.2d 769 (1987) (no abuse of
discretion in admitting social worker‘s testimony that child victim expressed surprise and fear
that witness knew of abuse). See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(3):1.
G.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4): Statements Made When the Declarant Is Seeking
Medical Treatment (or Diagnosis with a View to Treatment, If Necessary)

Foundation:
(1)

Declarant was seeking medical treatment or medical diagnosis in
contemplation of treatment (for oneself or loved one)

See Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480, 507, 510-11, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995) (Rodowsky, J.,
concurring, joined by Murphy, C.J.) (Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) extends to mental health care
provider).
Statements to nontreating physicians – employed with a view to litigation – are not
covered by the rule. E.g., Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 67 (1998) (examination by
physician who worked for the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services,
after a social worker‘s referral).
(2)

Speaking to someone declarant thought could provide or obtain such
treatment.

(3)

Describing past or present symptoms, pain, sensation, medical history,
inception or general character of the cause or external sources.

(4)

Only that part of the information that is “reasonably pertinent to
treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.”

(5)

Child declarant must understand treatment is at stake, so that accuracy
of statement will affect treatment.

This requirement was held not to have been met in, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,
33, 536 A.2d 666 (1988).
(6)

Identity of a perpetrator is admissible under this exception only if
medical professional testifies that identity is relevant to treatment or
diagnosis within Rule 8-303(b)(4) (and declarant must understand this
fact).

E.g., ―Somebody threw me down the stairs.‖

11

Compare, e.g., ―Daddy did it to me but he does it more to my sister.‖ ―Daddy gets drunk
and thinks I‘m his wife.‖
E.g., Griner v. State, 168 Md. App. 714, 745-46, 899 A.2d 189 (2006); Webster v. State,
151 Md. App. 527, 536, 827 A.2d 910 (2003) (examination by SAFE nurse); In re Rachel T., 77
Md. App. 20, 36, 549 A.2d 27 (1988) (given five-year-old Rachel‘s vaginal bleeding and
abnormally dilated hymen, ―it was possible that [she] had been exposed to venereal disease, and
may have required antibiotics‖ and ―[A]scertaining the identity of the abuser was also important
in the instant case because effective treatment might have required Rachel‘s removal from the
home.‖); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. at 34 n.14 (―When there is a danger that an assault victim
may have contracted a communicable disease, [however], the identity of the assailant may take
on significant medical pertinence.‖).
See Bentley v. Carroll, 355 Md. 312, 734 A.2d 697 (1999) (a patient properly stated a
medical malpractice claim against her treating physicians for failing to prevent continual,
long-term child sexual abuse by members of her household).
The Court of Appeals held in State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131, 950 A.2d 114 (2008), that
statements of a seven-year-old to a SAFE pediatric nurse practitioner, regarding sexual
abuse occurring over a year earlier, were erroneously admitted by the trial court as substantive
evidence, under Rule 5-803(b)(4). The appellate court reversed the resulting conviction, holding
that there was inadequate evidence to support a finding that the child, who was suffering no
physical symptoms at the time of the interview, understood that there was a medical
purpose for the examination. Although the nurse ordered testing for HIV, there was ―no
indication that [the child] had any understanding . . . , that she was at continued risk of
developing a latent sexually transmitted disease or HIV.‖ The fact that she was diagnosed with
genital herpes four months later did not relate back to this interview. 405 Md. at 145 n.11. The
child’s statement regarding the identity of her alleged abuser was inadmissible under this
exception ―because the identity of the perpetrator is not ordinarily of strict medical importance,
and Jazmyne T. was not aware that her statement was relevant to medical treatment or diagnosis.
Id. at 134.
See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(4):1.
H.

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Pro. § 11-304: The “Tender Years” Exception (applicable
to CINA cases)

Foundation:
(1)

Other hearsay exceptions are inapplicable and the proponent of the
evidence must give pretrial notice of intent to use this exception.

12

(2)

Alleged child abuse victim made statement when less than 12 years of
age.

See Nixon v. State, 140 Md. App. 170, 178-79, 185, 780 A.2d 344 (2001) (statute was
inapplicable when victim was sixteen years old, although she was mentally retarded and had a
mental age of approximately six years and two months).
The child abuse need not be sexual in nature. Cole v. State, 83 Md. App. 279, 304-05,
574 A.2d 326 (1990).
(3)

Statement was made to a physician, psychologist, nurse, social
worker, or teacher ―acting lawfully in the course of [his or her]
profession.‖

See Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 581-85, 886 A.2d 876 (2005) (social worker was
acting in the course of her profession when she interviewed alleged child abuse victim as result
of notification by police).
(4)

Trial judge finds statement to be reliable, considering all the criteria
in the statute.

(5)

The confrontation clause does not apply in non-criminal proceedings, so
the child need not (but may) testify at the hearing. If the child does not
testify, the child‘s out-of-court statement will be admissible only if there is
corroborative evidence that the alleged abuser had the opportunity to
commit the alleged offense.

See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(27):1.
I.

Rule 5-803(b)(8): Public (Government) Records

If a government agency or employee is the author, the public records exception of Md.
Rule 5-803(b)(8) applies, not the business records exception of Md. 5-803(b)(6). See generally
6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(8):1.
If the hearsay statement of a person outside the government (or business) is included,
another hearsay exception (or nonhearsay purpose) must be applicable, or else that part must be
redacted. Md. Rule 5-805. See, e.g., Hall v. University of Maryland Medical Sys. Corp., 398
Md. 67, 919 A.2d 1177 (2007). See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 805:1. When such a
problem of ―double hearsay‖ or ―multiple hearsay‖ arises, if the more recent out-of-court
statement cannot be admitted, there is an insuperable barrier. If it can be admitted, any ―double
hearsay‖ within it must be excluded, unless it also falls within hearsay exception or is admitted
for a relevant nonhearsay purpose. See, e.g., Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 130-31 (2001).
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The government declarant‘s hearsay statement may qualify under:
(1)

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A): government worker‘s own activities; or

(2)

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(B): government worker‘s report of others‘
activities, as to which government worker has duty to report; or

(3)

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(C): factual findings of government worker as a
result of investigation made pursuant to legal authority.

E.g., CASA‘s written reports to court re: background information, contacts, and
recommendations regarding placement (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-830;
Administrative Office of Courts CASA Rules and Guidelines at 4). See In re Billy W., 387 Md.
at 434-46; In re Wanda B., 69 Md. App. 105, 516 A.2d 615 (1986) (court-ordered psychiatric
report was admissible in CINA proceeding).
Inadmissible if shown to have relied on unreliable sources (burden on opponent who
seeks exclusion).
See also Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-1029(f) (agency‘s investigative report admissible
in independent adoption case in which parental consent is withheld).
(4)

Authentication: Certified Copies

Md. Rules 5-902(a) (method of certification) and 5-902(a)(4) (public records); Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-204 (from federal, any state, U.S. territory, political subdivision, or
agency thereof). See also, as to non-certified copies, Md. Rule 5-901(b)(7).
See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 901:8 & 902:3–9:02:4.
B.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6): Business Records

Foundation:
(1)

A writing;

(2)

Foundation laid by custodian or other qualified witness or certification [or
circumstantial evidence–] that

(3)

Made and kept in course of a ―business‖ activity;

(4)

Regular practice of that ―business‖ to make the writing; and
14

(5)

It was made at or near the time of the act, etc., recorded;

(6)

By (or from information from) a person with first-hand knowledge.

Then not excluded by the hearsay rule, UNLESS the source, method, or circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness (burden is on opponent to show this):
(1)

The Johnson v. Lutz doctrine: If the out-of-court statement of someone
not in the business is related in the business record, another hearsay
exception (or a nonhearsay purpose) for that statement must be found in
order to have that portion admitted. See Md. Rule 5-805.

(2)

The Palmer v. Hoffman doctrine: A self-serving out-of-court statement
made in anticipation of litigation, e.g., an accident report in which a
truck driver tells her employer she was obeying all rules of the road, is
unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible as a business record.

See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 803(6):1.
The business records hearsay exception is:
1.

Applied to hospital records, for example.
E.g., In re Colin R., 63 Md. App. 684, 691-94, 493 A.2d 1083 (1985).

2.

Assailable by opponent if business relied on unreliable sources.
E.g., Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 371-72, 478 A.2d 695 (1984) (hospital
records of blood alcohol tests made 3 days after blood was drawn).

Other relevant points:
1.

Need not call custodian or other witness to lay foundation: may lay
foundation through certificate according to form set forth in Md. Rule
5-902(b)(1)–(2) (advance notice of at least 10 days required, see Md. Rule
5-902(b)(1)).

2.

Multiple hearsay problem, Md. Rule 805.

3.

Subpoena
See Newcomb v. Owens, 54 Md. App. 597, 604-05, 459 A.2d 1130 (1983).
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IX.

Photographs: Authentication

Foundation: need not be the photographer, just a witness who saw the real thing and can
testify photo is a ―fair and accurate‖ representation of it.
See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 901:2; 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 403:5.
X.

Character Evidence to Prove Abuse or Neglect
See generally 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 404:1 et seq.
A.

Finding Required

When a court has reasonable grounds to believe that neglect or abuse of any child
has occurred, custody or visitation must be denied, except for supervised visitation, unless
the court makes a specific finding that there is no likelihood of further abuse or neglect. In
re Billy W., 387 Md. at 447, 450-51, 455-57 (citing Md. Code Ann., Fam. L. § 9-101); In re Yve
S., 373 Md. 551, 566-67, 819 A.2d 1030 (2003); In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. 209 (1999).
B.

Exceptions to Propensity Rule of General Exclusion
1.

The “Vogel” Exception

Maryland’s case law permits proof of prior sexual acts with the same alleged abuser
and the same victim. E.g., Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 72-76, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993) (evidence
properly admitted); Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d 1231 (1989). See Thompson v. State,
181 Md. App. 74, 955 A.2d 802 (2008), cert. granted, 406 Md. 744, 962 A.2d 371 (2008)
(victim‘s testimony to uncharged sexual abuse of her by defendant, including one instance when
he was also a juvenile, was properly admitted; trial court properly found that evidence was clear
and convincing and did not abuse its discretion in not excluding it under Md. Rule 5-403, where
victim‘s credibility was central to case and jury benefitted from understanding context of her
allegations).
2.

Domestic Spousal and Child Abuse

In Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 258, 674 A.2d 951 (1996), the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court‘s admission, in a hearing at which a spouse might obtain a protective
order pursuant to the domestic violence statute, of the defendant‘s alleged prior abusive acts
against the spouse. The court stressed the preventive nature of the proceeding and stated that the
evidence was not offered to prove that the defendant currently had acted in conformity with past
acts:
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The more abuse that occurred in the past, the higher the likelihood that future acts
of abuse will occur and thus, the need for greater protective measures. . . .
Evidence of prior incidents of abuse is therefore highly relevant both in assessing
whether or not to issue a protective order and in determining what type of
remedies are appropriate under the circumstances.
These proceedings seem analogous to shelter care proceedings in that respect. Cf. Md. Code
Ann., Fam. Law § 9-101.1 (as to whether to deny child custody or visitation rights to a parent, the
court may consider evidence of abuse by a party against: ―(1) the other parent of the party‘s
child; (2) the party‘s spouse; or (3) any child residing within the party‘s household, including a
child other than the child who is the subject of the custody or visitation proceeding.‖).
3.

“MIMIC,” Especially Proof of Other Specific Instances to Prove Absence
of Mistake or Accident.

See Wilson v. State, 136 Md. App. 27, 85-90, 764 A.2d 284 (2000), rev’d and remanded,
370 Md. 191, 216-17, 803 A.2d 1034 (2002) (in trial for murder of accused‘s infant child, on
whose life he had purchased insurance, evidence of his having purchased and recovered on life
insurance for two other infants who died under highly similar circumstances, when he was near
them, was properly admitted to show his motive, his intent, his identity as the perpetrator, and
the lack of accidental death) (this issue not addressed by Court of Appeals, as expert testimony
on remand would affect whether other death was properly viewed as a prior bad act); Dyson v.
State, 6 Md. App. 453, 456, 251 A.2d 606 (1969) (in prosecution for murder and child abuse,
photographs showing prior abuse of the victim admissible as showing intent or common scheme;
defendant testified that injuries were accidental). But see Boyd v. State, 399 Md. 457, 924 A.2d
1112 (2007) (in defendant‘s trial for violation of a protective order, reversible error to admit
other acts evidence on theory that it was relevant to defendant‘s absence of mistake, when he
never asserted that he acted mistakenly). See generally 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§
404:5–404:13.
XI.

Impeachment
A.

Md. Rule 5-608(b): Impeachment by Prior Bad Acts

See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 608:1.
1.

When the Person to Be Impeached Does Not Testify at the Hearing

When a witness does not testify at trial, but his or her out-of-court statement is admitted
as substantive evidence, Md. Rule 5-806 permits impeachment of that declarant. But how does
that square with Md. Rule 5-608(b)‘s exclusion of extrinsic evidence of a witness‘s prior bad acts
that did not result in conviction but are probative of a character for untruthfulness? The Court of
Appeals held in Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137, 963 A.2d 197 (2009), that a trial court committed
error (albeit harmless under the facts of the case) when it precluded impeachment of the
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non-testifying, third degree sexual assault victim with extrinsic evidence–testimony of other
witnesses–that the young victim had lied to others about his prior sexual experience. The
appellate court held that the defense should have been permitted to ask only the same
questions it could have properly asked the victim, had he testified. Further extrinsic proof
of the misconduct was precluded, just as it would have been, had the victim testified. See
generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 806:1 (impeachment of a nontestifying hearsay declarant).
2.

DSS Findings

Is a DSS conclusion that an allegation was “unfounded” evidence that it was false?
See Cookson v. Schwarz, 556 F.3d 647, 652-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (state court did not act contrary to
clearly established federal law in excluding, in child sexual abuse case, questioning of victim
about her charge–found by social services, on appeal, to be unfounded–that another person had
also sexually abused her; ―a DCFS finding that an allegation was ‗unfounded‘ does not, by itself
establish that the allegation was false‖) (footnote omitted).
B.

Md. Rule 5-613: Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statements

See generally 6 MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 613:1; Note, Legal and Scientific Issues
Surrounding Victim Recantation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 779 (2008).
Compare 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801(1):1 (admissibility of written or recorded inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence, when declarant testifies at the hearing).
XII.

Judicial Notice, Md. Rule 5-201

E.g., of other proceedings in same court, e.g., earlier DSS referrals (but not of truth of
earlier testimony nor of early record when adjudicative hearing is de novo). See generally 5
MARYLAND EVIDENCE §§ 201:1–201:5.
XIII. Burden of Proof
See In re Nicole B., 410 Md. 33, 976 A.2d 1039 (2009) (declining to decide whether the
federal requirement under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) that a party seeking to terminate parental rights
to, or put in foster care, a Native American child must have made ―active efforts‖ of remediation
and rehabilitation to keep the family together, is the same as the state standard under Md. Code
Ann., Fam. L. § 5-525(d) to make ―reasonable efforts . . . to preserve and reunify families‖;
holding that evidence showed that DHHS did make such ―active efforts‖ over the course of 15
months), rev’g 175 Md. App. 450, 927 A.2d 1194 (2007). Judge Raker (who is now retired),
joined by Chief Judge Bell, dissented; Judge Adkins (who is now on the Court of Appeals) wrote
the opinion for the CSA. Compare, as to failure to have made ―reasonable efforts,‖ In re James
G., 178 Md. App. 543, 943 A.2d 53 (2008).
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